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USING CASES AS CASE STUDIES FOR
TEACHING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
John S. Applegate*
My contribution to this symposium necessarily takes a somewhat different
perspective from others because, while I have taught Administrative Law
many times, I do not teach it now, and there is (alas) little prospect of my doing
so in the near future. Instead, I teach Environmental Law in various
permutations, and so I necessarily teach "Ad Law Lite" at least once a year
for my Environmental Law students who have not yet taken Administrative
Law. To someone who has taught the real thing, "Ad Law Lite" is frustrating
because it is so obvious how many topics and how much important detail are
missed. Moreover, because so much modem administrative lawhas developed
through environmental regulation cases, one has a continuing awareness that
some of the richness of environmental law is lost when the procedural side is
minimized. I have to console myself with an eamest injunctionto my students
to take Administrative Law as soon as possible.
This problem crystallized for me in the course of writing a chapter, The
Judicial Role in Toxics Regulation (a more dignified, though possibly less
accurate, title than "Ad Law Lite"), of a new casebook on the regulation of
toxic substances and hazardous wastes.' I will describe two aspects of
creating and teaching this primer on administrative law: the selection of topics
and the method of presenting them. The latter-which involves using cases
as case studies-is the main point of this paper, but I want to address the
former as well, because it sets the stage for the method of presentation.
I..
The content of the Judicial Role chapteris extremely straightforward. The
first section introduces students to formal and informal rulemaking and
adjudication, the basic forms of agency action under the Administrative
* Professor of Law and Charles L. Whistler Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School
of Law - Bloomington; B.A. 1978, Haverford College; J.D. 1981, Harvard University.
I JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL., THE REGULATION OF ToXIc SUBSTANCES AND
HAZARDOUS WASTES (Foundation Press - forthcoming).
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Procedure Act (APA).2 (Subtleties like interpretive rules- "guidance," in
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) parlance-are dealt with in
substantive settings.) The chapter emphasizes the legislative and judicial
analogies to these procedures as the basis for exploring, first, the reasons for
choosing one procedure over another and, second, the development of hybrid
procedures for agency decision making and judicial review. While
Environmental Law relies overwhelmingly on rulemaking to establish standards
and policies, important exceptions exist, the most important being the
registration of pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)3 And, of course, the ubiquitous permit requirements
involve adjudicatory procedures, albeit usually fairly informal. The dominance
ofrulemaking is partly historical accident (the emerging popularity of notice-
and-comment rulemaking at the time that the main environmental stattes were
enacted versus the 1947 origin of FIFRA), but it has important consequences
for the operation of the statutes. Furthermore, Congress has experimented
heavily with hybrid rulemaking in environmental statutes, and a solid
background in the sources of the procedural elements is helpful to
understanding their purpose and impact.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC4 permits presentation
of both of these points. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) chose a
mixture of rulemaking and adjudication for different parts of its overall
licensing strategy, and it chose the particular mix of procedures for a
combination of good (streamlining) and bad (avoiding questions to which it had
no good answers) reasons. The Supreme Court's rejection of judicially
imposed hybrid procedures provides the setting for considering the costs and
benefits of additional trial-like procedures and introducing the subsequent
Congressional adoption of the enhanced rulemaking procedures that play such
a prominent role in toxics legislation.
The second section of the chapter lays out the "methodology" ofjudicial
review. How does judicial review work? What questions do courts ask?
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe' is the obvious candidate for
presenting this, because itis such a comprehensive treatment-textbook-like,
really-of the review process under the APA. (It does not hurt for my
purposes that Overton Park is an environmental law case.) Overton Park
2 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
3 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-13 6 y (1999).
4 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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is followed by a brief textual description of the nature of the agency decision
(fact versus law versus exercise of discretion) and of hard-look review. I
saw little reason to cover judicial review of agency factual determinations of
the Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB variety in the chapter, but there was
no avoiding Chevron, USA., Inc. v. NRDC.7 While I toyed with the idea of
describing Chevron in text, because it is one part of the overall Overton Park
framework, so many of the cases that we excerpt for substantive purposes
elsewhere in the casebook refer to Chevron that presenting the case itself
seemed necessary to highlight its importance and to permit later reference.
The chapter emphasizes Chevron's analytical steps and the malleability of the
first step.
The final section of the chapter introduces students to the wide variation
in degree of deference that courts give to agency decisions. This is by far the
longest part of the chapter, because it is the administrative law phenomenon
that the students will see most frequently-and because it excerpts two very
long cases. Borrowing from an article by Kenneth Abraham and Richard
Merrill,' the chapter presents three models of judicial review of agency
judgment: "deference," represented by Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA;9
"avoidance," represented by Industrial Union Dep 't, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute"0 ("Benzene"); and "confrontation," represented by
Asbestos Information Association of North America v. OSHA. " The point,
of course, is that concepts like arbitrary and capricious, and even hard-look,
are far from fixed. This trio of cases provides an opportunity to explore not
only the techniques and criteria forjudicial evaluation of agency decisions, but
also the justifications for judicial interference and the problems of relative
institutional competence. Students should be prepared to see that individual
6 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
7 467 U.S. 837(1984).
8 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Richard A. MerrillScientific Uncertainty and the Courts,
IssuEs IN SCIENCE & TECH. 93, 94 (Winter 1986). The article was itself an effort to describe
judicial review to non-administrative lawyers (non-lawyers, in fact), which made it ideal for use
in a primer.
9 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
10 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
11 727 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1984). The archetype, which Abraham and Merrill use, is Gulf




cases in later chapters are the products of both issues specific to a particular
statutory regime and issues general to the relationship of agencies and courts.
Perhaps the most important omission from the chapter is the structural
constitutional law aspect of administrative law, a topic that occupied a great
deal of time in regular administrative law classes. One cannot overstate the
importance of the interbranch distribution of power to apolitically controversial
agency like the EPA.12 It is not only buffeted by winds from Capitol Hill, the
White House, and the Supreme Court, but it has frequently been the battlefield
(to mix metaphors) for interbranch warfare. For example, recent
Congressional efforts to impose additional risk and cost analysis requirements
on the EPA can be understood as the effort of Congress to rein in the
executive branch, drawing support from hard-look review of health and safety
regulations. 13 Unfortunately, important as these issues are, they would take
an administrative law primer in an Environmental Law course too far afield. 14
II.
In putting together our casebook, my co-authors and I wanted to
supplement the cases-and-questions method with other formats. Non-judicial
(indeed, non-legal) materials are of tremendous significance in environmental
regulation, and some topics are better addressed by text and problems than by
excerpts from court cases. In addition, we decided to use case studies to
convey a better sense of the interaction of facts, policy, and law. These
general preferences would seemto apply less forcefully to the administrative
law (especially the judicial review) part of the book because so much of
administrative law consists of a "common law" developed from terse
legislative or constitutional commands. While a textual approach could
obviously be effective (I thought about excerpting one of the fine summaries
of the above topics"), it would not do justice to the rich interactions between
12 1 have been told that Office of Industrial Resources Administration spends about half its
time on EPA regulations, a truly impressive controversy-to-budget-size ratio.
11 See generally Celia Campbell-Mohn & John S. Applegate, Learning from NEPA:
Guidelines for Responsible Risk Legislation, 23 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 93 (1999) (reviewing
and critiquing proposed legislation).
14 Our casebook does spend a fair amount of time on the Reagan and Clinton executive
orders (Nos. 12,291 and 12,866, respectively) that mandate cost-benefit analysis. Instead of
emphasizing the centralization ofpower issues, however, we use the similarities and differences
between them, and their application to a case study of air pollution control in the Los Angeles,
to make substantive points about economic analysis.
11 In LAKSHMAN GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
WoRLD ORDER (2d ed. 1999), the authors do exactly this in their international environmental
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substance and procedure in environmental law. So, instead of abandoning
cases, I expanded relevant cases to bring in substantive background; that is,
I turned the cases into case studies.
I do not claim any particular novelty for this idea. All court cases are
potential case studies. It is often overlooked by reformers ofteaching methods
that cases are often the best case studies because they are-
" real-though it may be difficult or time-consuming to discover, a full
context exists, and it involves a genuine dispute;
" important-no matter how technical the issue, it is important enough to
warrant the considerable expenditure of resources needed to bring a case
to trial or appeal, that is, it makes a real difference in the real world; and
* resolved authoritatively, rightly or wrongly-one is not left wondering how
a court (or agency) would resolve it.16
Even in basic common law courses, one regularly uses cases to explore factual
and policy issues that the opinion itself addresses incompletely, and casebooks
frequently include such materials in notes. Our chapter simply expands this
practice.
The Judicial Role chapter created two case studies out of judicial
decisions. As I explained above, Vermont Yankee conveniently addresses (or
permits one to address) both the reasons for choosing between nilemaking and
adjudication and the development of hybrid procedures for agency decision
making and judicial review. Unfortunately, Justice Rehnquist's opinion is so
determined to demonstrate the egregious (in his view) error of the D.C.
Circuit's approach that it gives absolutely no credence to, or real explanation
of, the concerns that led to the appellate court's decision. However, the D.C.
Circuit's opinion explains why it regarded NRC's treatment ofthe radioactive
waste disposal problem as cavalier to the point of irresponsibility.17 And this
law casebook. They face the Iruly daunting prospect of summarizing international law for
environmental law students, and so make effective use of their own text and excerpts from
others' textbooks.
16 I don't mean to suggest that problems or hypotheticals are never appropriate teaching
tools. Quite the contrary-they are often the best way to isolate or highlight specific issues in
a way that existing cases often do not
" See NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976),rev'd, Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). I have learned from Peter Strauss, who was
1999-20001
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goes a long way toward understanding the significance of the choice between
rulemaking and adjudication.
The case study begins with a very brief background text and the D.C.
Circuit opinion. NRC's licensing process for the Vermont Yankee plant
introduces the standard bipolar APA procedures: a formal adjudication for the
permit itself, and an informal (actually, hybrid) rulemaking for the generic
scoring of the environmental effects of nuclear waste disposal. The scoring
system produced a zero value for the environmental impacts ofnuclear waste
disposal, and this score was factored into the evaluation of individual permit
applications. One can easily infer from Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion why
NRC chose the process it did and why NRDC wanted more opportunities to
challenge the agency's assertions.
Next, an excerpt from the Supreme Court's opinion succinctly lays out the
basic arguments for not expanding agency procedures, and they can be
debated on the basis of the materials in the case study.
The case study concludes with the part of the Supreme Court's Baltimore
Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC'8 decision that affirmed NRC's assumption of
zero environmental impact for nuclear waste disposal. The opinion is a "soft
glance" if ever there was one, and it confirms the enormous substantive
significance of NRC's initial procedural choices. The significance of the
procedural choice is heightened in this case study by the fact that history has
largely vindicated NRDC's explicit (and the D.C. Circuit's implicit) position in
the rulemaking that NRC did not have the waste disposal problem well in hand.
To this day, there is no credible solution to nuclear waste disposition, despite
(or because of) NRC's "vague assurances.., that problems as yet unsolved
will be solved." 19 As Judge Bazelon suspected, NRC had no clear idea how
to deal with nuclear waste, a point made in the casebook's notes toBaltimore
Gas.
The case study's notes also point out that Congress has chosen to adopt
hybrid procedures in many environmental statutes. This emphasizes the scope
General Counsel of NRC, that the D.C. Circuit's characterization ofNRC's conduct was unfair.
In fact, NRC spent quite a bit of time at the hearing in question discussing the problem of
nuclear waste disposal. Both the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit opinion, therefore, also
represent a valuable caution in using cases as case studies, that case reports are not infallible
descriptions of events.
18 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
19 NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d at 653, rev 'd, Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519.
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ofthe Vermont Yankee holding (i. e., it is limited to judicial innovation), and it
sets up the later point that procedural remedies are double-edged swords. The
additional procedures that NRDC wanted to use against NRC have been
effectively deployed by industry against EPA.
The third section of the chapter is built around a different kind of case
study. The clearest way to highlight changes in one feature of a phenomenon
is to hold all of the background features constant. So, in attempting to convey
the different standards and moods ofjudicial review, it would have been ideal
to show different judicial responses to the same agency decision. Because
that does not happen, as a second best I gathered cases dealing with a single
toxic substance. My inspiration for this technique was a brilliant collection of
slip-and-fall cases, mainly involving banana peels in various states of decay,
originally assembled by William Prosser. He used themto illustrate the ideas
of circumstantial evidence and burden of proof as a prelude to his casebook's
treatment of res ipsa loquitur.2°
For toxic substances, I chose asbestos. Asbestos has been regulated by
just about every federal health, safety, and environmental agency under just
about every federal health, safety, and environmental statute, so there are
plenty of cases from which to choose three representing the deference,
avoidance, and confrontation approaches. Moreover, it is one of a relatively
small group of known human carcinogens-there is no real question that it
causes cancer-making ajudicial decision to rejectregulatory controls all the
more striking.
The case study then turns to Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,2 a 1975 case
involving the discovery of asbestos fibers in the Duluth drinking water supply.
The asbestos came from mining spoil dumped by the Reserve Mining
Company into Lake Superior, and the Eighth Circuit enjoined further
discharges under the Clean Water Act. Reserve Mining is the weakest
factual case of the trio-while asbestos is clearly carcinogenic when inhaled,
its effects when ingested were (and remain) uncertain. Nevertheless, the
court showed great deference to EPA's belief that ingesting drinking water
posed a serious hazard and upheld the requested injunction, modified to give
20 See JoHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S TORTS (8th ed.).
21 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
1999-2000]
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Reserve Mining time to comply.22 By supporting regulatory action despite
significant uncertaintyReserve Mining exemplifies the deference approach. 23
The "avoidance" case is Benzene,24 which, as its name indicates, is not
about asbestos at all. However,Benzene is the only Supreme Court case that
squarely addresses the unique substantive problems of regulating toxic
substances. In addition, it was decided just as EPA was beginning to focus on
toxic substances as a special category, so it has been extremely influential in
the casebook's area of law. No respectable survey of judicial review of
agency decisions ontoxic substances could fail to highlight it, so neatness and
consistency were sacrificed to historical accuracy.25 The plurality opinion in
Benzene rejected OSHA's regulation of this epidemiologically demonstrated
carcinogen, 26 not by challenging OSHA's toxicological and economic
conclusions directly, but by finding that OSHA's legal approach inappropriately
shifted the burden of proof from itselfto employers. The plurality was clearly
convinced that the regulation was unwise, but its technique for expressing
disapproval was aggressive statutory interpretation.
Finally, to demonstrate the "confrontation" approach, Asbestos
Information Association2 7 takes direct issue with the quality of the data used
by OSHA to justify its emergency standard for asbestos. Asbestos
Information Association puts the agency through its paces on each element
of proof for standards relating to the inhalation of asbestos, despite the fact
that this is the clearly carcinogenic route of exposure. It is in this sense the
exact opposite ofReserveMining: there is strong proof of potential injury, yet
the court rejects the agency's particular method of addressing it.
2 See Reserve Mning, 514 F.2d at 499.
23 Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974), is also
available as an asbestos deference case, and it is attractive for a casebook because it contains the
"frontiers of science" language that figures so heavily in the judicial approach to reviewing
agency action. The facts ofReserve Mining are more interesting, however, so Hodgson and its
protege, Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976), are handled in the notes.
24 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
There is, in fact, a perfect avoidance case involving asbestos, Corrosion Proof Fittings,
Inc. v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991), but its analysis is not based onBenzene in any way
that would make it an adequate substitute. Instead, Corrosion Proof is featured in the chapter
on the Toxic Substances Control Act
26 A previous chapter excerpted one of the principal epidemiological studies on which
OSHA relied in regulating benzene.
27 Asbestos Info. Ass'n of N. Am. v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1984).
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The central problem in regulating toxic substances is pervasive uncertainty
concerning the nature and magnitude of their health effects, especially at low
levels of exposure. These three cases not only demonstrate a range of options
forjudicial review of agency action generally, but they also demonstrate very
differentjudicial expectations for the precision of agency justifications of the
regulation of toxic substances. Furthermore, they display a roughly historical
progression: the days of extreme deference to toxics controls are over, and
Asbestos Information Association seems to represent the present, highly
critical approach.
Needless to say, in case studies using series of actual cases, reality rarely
permits the luxury of holding the background perfectly constant-even Prosser
had to use a pizza slice case in his banana series.28 My series substituted a
benzene case, as noted, and it used cases that applied very different legal
standards. Nevertheless, the ability to compare and contrast alimited number
of cases involving similar substances allows the instructor to highlight the
differences that thejudicial approach (and applicable legal standard) make to
the outcome of disputes.
Space limitations prevented me from making further use of the case study
technique. It was very tempting to turn Overton Park into a fairly elaborate
case study of the power ofjudicial review. We hint at this point with a road
map that shows how the Memphis highway system was based on the Overton
Park segment of 1-40 and its absence leaves a major gap in the plan.
Moreover, Peter Strauss has written an article on the political and social setting
of the case that provides a wealth of background material and analysis.29
However, the benefits and potential drawbacks of this form of citizen and
judicial activism are really beyond the scope of a primer. Likewise, Chevron
lends itself to an investigation of emissions trading and the judicial role in
finding flexibility for agencies to experiment with new forms of regulation.
This would also have been germane to the chapter, but the moods ofjudicial
review seemed more important. The methodology section of the chapter
needed to present the overall analytical framework forjudicial review, which
is better served by the treatise-like presentation of the unadomedOverton
Park opinion and the traditional case-and-notes presentation of Chevron.
28 See WADE ET AL., supra note 20.
29 See Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park." Political and Judicial Controls Over




Finally, just as administrative law case studies can enrich an environmental
law course, environmental law case studies can enrich an administrative law
course. The third edition of Breyer & Stewart's casebook, for example,
places a lengthy note on carcinogens and cost-benefit analysis in its coverage
of the use of statutory interpretation to control agency discretion.3
Environmental case law is a good source of case studies in other areas of
administrative law, as well. By way of engaging in the environmentally correct
practice of recycling, Benzene can be deployed yet again to particularize
students' understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of a strong non-
delegation doctrine. In his Benzene concurrence, Justice Rehnquist made a
strong argument that the radix malorum of what he viewed as OSHA's
extravagant regulation was Congress' failure to define the trade-off between
dollars and lives that its statute required.3" The plurality, hesitant to resurrect
the long-buried and little-missed Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan32 and
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,3 3 treated the nondelegation
doctrine as a canon of statutory interpretation to bolster its reinterpretation of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The dissent, written by Justice
Marshall, denounced the whole enterprise.34
Together, the principal opinions in the case suggest the issues involved in
setting legislative standards for carcinogens, but a fuller explication of the
relevant risk and economic analysis (emphasizing their uncertainties and
limitations) would help students to see why Congress generally adopts
narrative, as opposed to quantitative, legislative standards, and why it is not
necessarily shirking its constitutional duties in doing so. Justice Marshall's
initial draft opinion discussed risk assessment very explicitly as a way of
persuading more of his colleagues that Congress' general commands and
OSHA's interpretation of them were reasonable.3 Supplementing Benzene
with material on risk and cost analysis would also illustrate the extentto which
30 STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 335-51 (4th ed. 1998).
"' See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,687-88
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
32 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
33 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
"' See Industrial, 448 U.S. at 688-724 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31 My source is a conversation with Sidney Shapiro, who has read the Benzene draft
opinions among the Marshall papers in the Library of Congress.
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certain kinds of regulatory standards (quantitative, multi-factorial) delegate
fundamental choices to administrative agencies. This shifts power to the
executive branch, which in the context of risk regulation has sparked a
Congressional counter-revolution that aims to specify the analytical tools that
agencies must use in implementing their authorizing statutes. As has been
frequently observed, the nondelegation doctrine, alive or dead, asks us to
confront basic questions of who decides and how they decide the content of
regulatory controls. The recent reappearance of the nondelegation doctrine
in the D.C. Circuit case overturning EPA's new ozone and particulate matter
standards confirms the continuing importance of these issues.,
Cases are an excellent source of case studies. Administrative law
instructors, in my observation, already tend to be very sensitive to the
substantive settings of the procedural cases they use. By providing
background, the context of other cases, or by mining cases for details that are
often left out in the excerpting process, one can provide students with an
additional, rich source of factual and policy materials and an opportunity to see
regulatory disputes from the perspective of one or more of their participants.
This can provide a degree of concreteness and specificity that is frequently
elusive in teaching administrative law.
"I See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999),opinion
modifiedon rehearing by, 195 F.3d4 (D.C. Cir. 1999),petitionforcertfiled,68 U.S.L.W. 3496
(U.S. Jan. 27,2000) (No. 99-1263).
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